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ABSTRACT 
The Internet of Things (IoT) is a global ecosystem of information 
and communication technologies aimed at connecting any type of 
object (thing), at any time and in any place, to each other and to 
the Internet. One of the major problems associated with the IoT is 
maintaining security; the heterogeneous nature of such 
deployments poses a challenge to many aspects of security, 
including security testing and analysis. In addition, there is no 
existing mechanism that performs security testing for IoT devices 
in different contexts. In this paper, we propose an innovative 
security testbed framework targeted at IoT devices. The security 
testbed supports both standard and context-based security testing, 
with a set of security tests conducted under the different 
environmental conditions in which IoT devices operate. The 
requirements and architectural design of the proposed testbed are 
discussed, and the testbed operation is demonstrated in several 
testing scenarios.   
CCS Concepts 
• Security and privacy➝Systems Security➝Vulnerability 
management • Computing methodologies➝Machine learning. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Internet of Things (IoT) consists of the combination of 
physical objects with sensors, actuators, and controllers with 
connectivity to the public world via the Internet. The low cost of 
hardware, along with the prevalence of mobile devices and 
widespread Internet access, has made the IoT a part of modern 
everyday life. An exponential increase in the use of the IoT is 
expected in the future; as it does, security issues must increasingly 
be considered given that all IoT devices are connected to the 
Internet, providing the means for hackers to obtain access to these 
devices. 
SHODAN [1], the IoT search engine, shows the dark side of 
connected IoT devices, where several vulnerabilities have been 
discovered using this tool [2] [3]. Different Internet connected 
devices, ranging from cameras to industrial controllers, can be 
easily manipulated [4] [5]. These studies confirm both: 1) the fact 
that IoT devices, by their very nature, are prone to attacks, and 2) 
the need to seriously consider security measures for such devices. 
Furthermore, no common security standard exists for all IoT 
devices. Although there is a need to address the security 
challenges of the IoT ecosystem, a flexible method for evaluating 
the security of IoT devices does not currently exist, and there is a 
lack of dedicated testbeds to perform security testing and analysis 
on IoT devices [6].   
The development of a testbed to perform comprehensive 
security testing and analysis for IoT devices under real conditions 
will help to remedy this situation. We propose a fully functional 
IoT testbed for security analysis in which various IoT devices 
such as smart home devices and smart wearables, as well as 
wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are tested against a set of 
security requirements. The IoT testbed emulates different types of 
testing environments which simulates various sensors activity 
(GPS, movement, Wi-Fi, etc.) and performs predefined and 
customized security tests. The testbed also collects data while 
performing the security test, used to conduct security forensic 
analysis. Furthermore, the report produced contains the type of 
IoT device, connectivity, communication protocols supported, and 
security test cases executed and their status (PASS or FAIL).  
The testbed consists of hardware and software components for 
experiments of wide-scale testing deployments. A variety of test 
cases are provided by the proposed testbed such as standard, 
contextual, data, and side channel tests. Thus, the security testbed 
must support a range of security tests, each aimed at different 
aspect of security. Standard security testing will be performed 
based on vulnerability scans and penetration test methodology, in 
order to assess and verify the security level of IoT devices under 
test. (See Appendix A for a list of supported tests.) In addition, 
advanced security testing will be performed by the security 
testbed using different arrays of simulators. 
Given the fact that the vast majority of security technologies 
adopted today are primarily focused on alerting users about 
specific technical aspects of an attack, rather than the root cause 
of an attack, the implementation of automated detection processes 
can be difficult. Moreover, defining the requirements for the 
development and implementation of such a testbed will also be a 
challenging task. Therefore, in this paper we divide these 
requirements into functional and non-functional requirements. 
The testbed architecture and design presented in this paper is a 
layer-based platform model with a modular structure. Based on 
this any type of IoT device can be tested in the proposed security 
testbed framework, including smart appliances, smart city devices, 
smart wearable devices, and more. In addition, any relevant 
simulator and/or measurement and analysis tool can be deployed 
in the testbed environment in order to perform comprehensive 
testing in the testbed. 
The main contributions of this paper are threefold: 
 We propose a set of requirements that are required for 
building an IoT security testbed. 
 We propose a novel testbed architecture which is modular 
and adaptable. 
 We present various test cases evaluated in our testbed. 
The structure of the paper is as follows: after providing the 
introduction to the testbed in Section 1, related work is discussed 
in Section 2. In Section 3, we propose the necessary requirements 
for building the testbed. In Section 4, we introduce the testbed 
architecture and design which includes the security modules used 
for testing purposes. Section 5 provides several examples of 
security tests conducted using our proposed testbed, and we 
conclude in Section 6. 
2. RELATED WORK 
Several testbeds have been proposed for IoT devices [6]. In 
addition, there are a few labs around the world that focus on IoT 
security [7]. Most of the recent work on IoT testbeds tends to 
focus on a single technology domain (e.g., WSNs) [8] [9] [10] 
[11]. Others take a more heterogeneous approach to the study of 
IoT testbeds [12] [13]. There are very few studies using various 
IoT devices and focusing on multiple technology domains [14].  
MoteLab [8], provides a testbed system for WSNs, was one of 
the first testbeds developed. Still in use today, it has also served as 
the basis for various other testbeds such as INDRIYA [15]. 
Kansei [9] is one of the most surveyed testbeds, which provides 
advanced various functions, including co-simulation support, 
mobility support using mobile robots, event injection possible 
mote level. CitySense [10] is a public mesh testbed deployed on 
light poles and buildings. Two features make this testbed 
particularly interesting: 1) its realism and domain specificity 
provided by a permanent outdoor installation in an urban 
environment, and 2) the realization of the control and 
management plane based solely on wireless links. The Senselab 
[11] testbed consists of more than 1000 sensor nodes with energy 
measurement supported for every node and repeatable mobility 
via electric toy trains. In [12] the testbed consists of federation 
architecture, co-simulation support, topology virtualization, in-situ 
power measurements on some nodes, and mobility support. FIT 
IoT-LAB [13] provides a very large scale infrastructure facility 
suitable for testing small wireless sensor devices and 
heterogeneous communicating objects. The testbed offers web-
based reservation and tooling for application development, along 
with direct command-line access to the platform. However, all of 
the abovementioned IoT testbeds focus solely on WSNs. 
The T-City Friedrichshafen [14] testbed considers various IoT 
devices, making it multi-domain; operated by Deutsche Telekom, 
it combines innovative information and communication 
technologies, together with a smart energy grid, to test out 
innovative healthcare, energy, and mobility services. Although the 
T-City Friedrichshafen testbed is multi-domain, it fails to take into 
account security aspects.  
INFINITE [16], the Industrial Internet Consortium approved 
testbed, encompasses all of the major technologies, domains, and 
platforms for industrial IoT environments, covering the cloud, 
networks, mobile, sensors, and analytics. Projects such as 
FIESTA-IoT [17] provide a blueprint experimental infrastructure 
for heterogeneous IoT technologies. The FIESTA-IoT project 
consists of various testbeds like SmartCampus [18] and 
SmartSantander [19]. SmartSantander proposes a unique city-
scale experimental research facility for common smart city 
applications and services. In [20], authors propose ASSET 
(Adaptive Security for Smart Internet of Things in eHealth), a 
project to develop risk-based adaptive security methods and 
mechanisms for IoT in eHealth. The project proposes a testbed to 
accurately evaluate adaptive security solutions in realistic 
simulation and use case scenarios, however the project does not 
address multi-domain IoT devices and security aspects. 
Stanford’s Secure Internet of Things Project [7] is a cross-
disciplinary research effort between computer science and 
electrical engineering faculty at Stanford University; the 
University of California, Berkeley; and the University of 
Michigan. The research effort focuses on three key questions: 
analytics, security, and hardware and software systems. Though 
the project is focused on securing IoT devices, the testbed to 
secure IoT devices has not yet been discussed in [7]. 
Hence, based on our knowledge, critical gaps exist, and a 
testbed that focuses on security testing for IoT devices, and 
especially considering different context environments, has not yet 
been developed. 
3. SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS 
The requirements for a security testbed for the Internet of 
Things can be classified and formulated on various abstraction 
levels. The highest abstraction level reflects the security 
objectives. An example of a security objective could be "The 
system must be reliable and scalable for various scenarios."  
Security requirements can stem from end-users’ needs, 
prioritized risk scenarios, regulation laws, and best practices and 
standards. The system requirements section provides an overview 
of functional and non-functional requirements. The functional 
requirements include the behavioral requirements for a system to 
be operational, while the non-functional requirements describe the 
key performance indicators. 
3.1 Functional Requirements 
The functional requirements are the conditions or capabilities 
needed in the system to ensure the fulfilment of the testbed. For 
example, the tests supported, test definition, analysis of the test 
results, etc. Moreover, the functional requirements pertain to 
expected system inputs and the outputs to be produced, and the 
relationships between those inputs and outputs. Furthermore, 
these requirements describe the series of steps that are needed in 
order for the testbed to be operational, ranging from initializing 
the test to producing the test reports. Table 1 presents a concise 
list of functional requirements for a security testbed. 
Table 1. Functional Requirements of the Security Testbed 
Functional Requirements Description  
Action initialization  Ability to simulate real world conditions and 
initialize the testing process. 
Detection of IoT devices Ability to detect all of the IoT devices within the 
testbed.  
Adding/removing a test 
case 
Ability to add/remove a test case in the testbed 
(test cases are different types of security 
vulnerabilities). 
Automatically running a 
test case. 
Ability to run the test case automatically with 
minimal or no intervention for all connected 
devices. 
Logging the status of each 
test case 
Ability to log the status of each test case in real-
time. 
Report generation Ability to generate a report for all test cases 
executed in the testbed. 
3.1.1 Initialization and Detection 
One of the primary functional requirements of the IoT testbed 
is to establish a realistic environment for the various tests 
performed. The IoT devices within the testbed should perform 
their usual tasks, as they are intended to do. By using the 
simulators, stimulators, and any other tools needed, the testbed 
should simulate real world conditions in order to test the IoT 
devices in different contexts. 
After initialization and activation of the IoT device, the next 
requirement is the detection of the IoT device present in the 
testbed environment. During the detection process, a log file 
should be created consisting of the IoT device OS, the processes 
running, actions being performed, etc. This information will be 
used for any subsequent anomaly detection. The detection process 
should also be used in case scenarios involving compromised IoT 
devices that are present within the testbed environment in order to 
perform attacks on other IoT devices. 
3.1.2 Security Tests 
The IoT testbed must supports a range of security tests, each 
targeting a different security aspect. The testbed should detect 
various vulnerabilities that IoT devices can be prone to and 
provide analysis and proof of concept to these vulnerabilities. 
Accordingly, a security testbed should takes into account some of 
the vulnerabilities from OWASP [21], including: 
 Injection: The IoT devices are prone to injection flaws such 
as SQL, OS, and LDAP during command or query. 
 Broken Authentication and Session Management: IoT 
devices are easily compromised with implementation flaws 
such as passwords, session tokens, etc. [2]. 
 Cross-Site Scripting (XSS): When untrusted data is 
received by an IoT device and sent to a browser, XSS flaws 
can occur. 
 Security Misconfiguration: Secure configurations must be 
defined for the IoT devices and secure settings should be 
implemented and maintained, particularly in cases such as 
smart homes which may be connected to a variety of IoT 
devices.  
 Sensitive Data Exposure: While communicating with IoT 
devices or when two or more IoT devices communicate with 
each other, the data needs to be protected and the 
communication layer requires extra protection such as 
encryption at rest or in transit. 
 Missing Function Level Access Control: The IoT device 
needs to perform the access control checks on the server, to 
prevent attackers from forging requests in order to access 
functionality without proper authorization. 
 Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities: Data loss 
or server takeover can be facilitated by an attack when 
vulnerable components in the IoT device are exploited; this, 
in turn, can undermine IoT defenses and enable attacks. 
In addition, the testbed should support templates of tests and 
scenarios. The testbed should be capable of running automated 
tests based on specific requirements (e.g., extract all tests that are 
relevant to the accelerometer sensor) or the device type (e.g., all 
tests that are relevant to IP cameras). Moreover, the tests within 
the testbed should be executed in a sequential manner and with an 
appropriate structure. Furthermore, the testbed should provide a 
success criteria for each test (for example, binary pass/fail or a 
scale from 1-[pass] to 5 [fail], which may be based on a 
predefined threshold provided by the system operator in advance). 
Moreover, the success criteria should not be generic and should be 
defined for a specific tested IoT device and/or tested scenario. The 
system must be able to evaluate the test results against the test 
criteria. 
3.1.3 Logging and Analysis 
After conducting a series of functional requirement steps, the 
testbed should be capable of logging the tests. The system collects 
various data during the test execution, including network traffic 
information (e.g., about Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, and ZigBee operation), 
IoT device internal status information (e.g. CPU utilization, 
memory consumption, and file system activity), etc. This 
information should be stored as a log file for further analysis. 
In addition, the testbed system should support intelligent 
analysis. For some tests the system operator should be able to 
define a decision rule specifying whether the device passed the 
test or not. For example, if the existing vulnerability test module 
identifies high risk vulnerability the device fails the test, etc. Such 
rules should be defined for specific types of IoT devices, data 
sources, and testbed capabilities. In some cases it is impossible to 
define a hard decision rule and the testbed should expose the 
results of analysis modules (e.g. anomaly detection model) 
through a user interface for manual exploration and decision. 
3.2 Non-Functional Requirements 
The non-functional requirements are the set of attributes which 
characterize the IoT testbed. Therefore, these requirements tend to 
be related and can be derived from functional requirements. The 
non-function requirements are as follows. 
3.2.1 Usability 
Usability ensures the testbed’s ease of use, without the need for 
extensive efforts on the part of the user. Security testbed should be 
easy to operate and use (with easily defined tests, easy to input 
configuration and to interpret output). 
3.2.2 Security-Related 
 Reliability: is the ability of the IoT testbed to perform its 
required functions under the stated conditions for a specific 
period of time. Furthermore, reliability can be considered as: 
(a) the availability of the IoT testbed service when requested 
by end-users, and (b) the failure rate which is how often the 
IoT testbed fails to deliver the service requested by the users. 
 Anti-Forensic: is the capability of the testbed to detect and 
subsequently prevent malicious applications on the IoT 
device (if it has been infected) from being activated. 
Malicious applications, in particular, tend to disturb the 
forensic analysis operation, and the testbed should be able to 
prevent the IoT device from being activated to overwrite any 
sensitive data that shouldn't fall into the wrong hands. 
 Security: is the ability of the testbed to ensure authorized 
access to the system. To safeguard the integrity of the IoT 
testbed from accidental or malicious damage, security 
requirements should maintain: 1) access permissions, where 
the testbed data may only be changed by the system 
administrator; 2) backup of all testbed data in database; and 
3) encrypted communication between the different 
components and parties of the testbed.  
 Accountability (including non-repudiation):  is the 
capability of the testbed to keep audit records to support 
independent review of access to resources/uses of 
capabilities – not only the data collected, but also the log 
files must be specified and protected. 
 Controlled: is the ability of the testbed to prevent malicious 
IoT devices from being activated. 
3.2.3 Adaptive 
The security testbed should be able to adapt in accordance with 
new application domain concepts and support various 
communication types. 
 Scalability: is the capability of the testbed to increase total 
throughput under an increased load when resources (typically 
hardware) are added. 
 Performance: is the ability of the speed of operation of the 
testbed. Performance requirements pertain to: 1) throughput 
requirements which define how much the testbed can 
accomplish within a specified amount of time, and 2) 
response requirements which define how quickly the testbed 
reacts to user input. 
 Flexibility: is the capability to modify the testbed after 
deployment. This includes: 1) adaptability, the ability of the 
testbed to be adapted based on new requirements and 
application domain concepts; 2) sustainability, the ability to 
fix faults and deal with new technology; and 3) 
customizability, the capability of the testbed configuration to 
be customized and fine-tuned by the user. 
4. TESTBED ARCHITECTURE AND 
DESIGN 
In this section, the architecture and design of the proposed 
security testbed for IoT devices are presented. This includes an in-
depth description of the testbed’s modules and system 
components (both software and hardware based).   
4.1 System Architecture 
The functional architecture model of the security testbed, 
illustrated in Figure 1, is designed based on the requirements 
described in Section 3. It is a layer-based platform model with a 
modular structure, which means that any type of IoT device can 
be tested in the proposed security testbed framework, including 
smart appliances, smart city devices, smart wearable devices, and 
more. In addition, any relevant simulator and/or measurement or 
analysis tool can be deployed in the testbed environment. A 
detailed description of the modules that comprise the functional 
model and the interactions between these modules as a complete 
security testing system are provided. Note that the architecture 
model suggested here is based on our existing model, as the 
current work is a continuation of research in this subject.  
4.1.1 Management and Reports Module (MRM)  
This module is responsible for a set of management and control 
actions, including starting/initializing the test, enrolling new 
devices, simulators, tests, measurement and analysis tools, and 
communication channels, and generating the final reports upon 
completion of the test. The testbed operator (the user) interfaces 
with the testbed through this module using one of the 
communication interfaces (CLI\SSH\SNMP\WEB-UI) in order to 
initiate the test, as well as to receive the final reports. 
Accordingly, the module interacts with the Security Testing 
Manager Module and the Measurements and Analysis Module, 
respectively. The MRM contains a system database component 
that stores all relevant information about the tested device 
(including the OS, connectivity, sensor capabilities, advanced 
features, etc.), as well as stores information regarding the test 
itself (including config files, system snapshots, and test results). 
4.1.2 Security Testing Manager Module (STMM) 
This module is responsible for the actual testing sequence 
executed by the security testbed (possibly according to regulatory 
specifications). Accordingly, it interacts with the Security Testing 
Module in order to execute the required set of tests, in the right 
order and mode, based on predefined configurations provided by 
the user (based on the config file loaded in the MRM). 
4.1.3 Security Testing Module (STM) 
This module performs standard security testing based on 
vulnerability assessment and penetration test methodology, in 
order to assess the security level of the IoT device under test 
(DUT). See Appendix A for a list of supported tests and the 
appropriate test/success criteria for each test. The STM is an 
operational module which executes a set of security tests as 
plugins, each of which performs a specific task in the testing 
process. The module also supports a context-based testing mode, 
where it generates various environmental stimuli for each 
sensor/device under test. Meaning, in this mode of operation, the 
STM simulates different environmental triggers and runs the 
security tests, in order to identify and detect context-based attacks 
that may be launched by the IoT-DUT. This is obtained using a 
simulator array list, such as a GPS simulator or Wi-Fi localization 
simulator (for location-aware and geolocation-based attacks), time 
simulator (using simulated cellular network, GPS simulator, or 
local NTP server), movement simulator (e.g., using robots), etc. 
See Table 2 for a list of supported simulators. The module 
interacts with the Measurements and Analysis Module in order to 
monitor and analyze the test performed. 
4.1.4 Measurements and Analysis Module (MAM) 
This module employs a variety of measurement (i.e., data 
collection) components and analysis components (both software 
and hardware-based). The measurement components include 
different network sniffers for communication monitoring such as 
Wi-Fi, cellular, Bluetooth, and ZigBee sniffers, and device 
Figure 1. Security testbed framework - abstract 
functional architecture model. 
monitoring tools for measuring the internal status of the devices 
under test. The analysis components process the collected data 
and evaluate the results according to a predefined success 
criterion. Note that most of the predefined success criteria are not 
generic and are defined for a specific tested IoT device and/or 
tested scenario. In some cases, a success criterion cannot be 
clearly defined, therefore advanced analysis tools and mechanisms 
will be deployed in the testbed (for example, a network-based 
anomaly detection tool will be employed to process the recorded 
network traffic of the tested IoT device in order to detect 
anomalous events in the system). In this case, the pass/fail 
decision will be based on a predefined threshold provided by the 
system operator in advance. The detected anomalies should then 
be investigated and interpreted by the system operator using 
dedicated exploration tools which are part of the user interface. 
Table 2. Simulators Supported by the Security Testbed 
Simulator  Description  
Network The testbed uses network simulators to simulate different 
network environments, such as Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, ZigBee, and 
more, in order to support different network connectivity in the 
testbed. 
Location The testbed simulates different locations and trajectories using 
the GPS generator device, in order to test the behavior of the 
IoT device under test in different locations/trajectories. 
Time The testbed simulates different days of the week and times of 
day using either the GPS generator device, internal NTP server, 
or internal cellular network, in order to test the behavior of the 
IoT device under test at different times. 
Movement The testbed simulates different movements using either robots 
or human testers, in order to test the behavior of the IoT device 
under test while performing different movements. 
Lighting The testbed simulates different lighting levels, in order to test 
the behavior of the IoT device under test in different lighting 
scenarios. 
Audio The testbed simulates audio using a voice simulator, in order to 
test the behavior of the IoT device under test in different sound 
environments. 
Video The testbed simulates images, pictures, and videos using a 
video simulator, in order to test the behavior of the IoT device 
under test during different video changes. 
4.1.5 Testing Process 
The testing process shown in Figure 1 starts by loading a 
configuration file (by the user/testbed operator) in the testbed via 
the MRM component. Based on the configuration loaded, a set of 
security testing is conducted in the testbed (illustrated as Phase 1 
on the red line in Figure 1) using the STM component. The results 
are then stored in the system database component. Next, context-
based security testing is performed using the STM component 
(illustrated as Phase 2 on the black dashed line in Figure 1), by 
selecting the appropriate simulators for the test. In this phase, 
different simulators are employed in order to realistically simulate 
the environment in which IoT devices operate, and the same set of 
security tests are conducted (again, based on the configuration file 
loaded in advance). The results obtained are then stored in the 
system database component. Both of these testing phases are 
controlled by the STMM component. Note that during the 
execution of the testing process, different measurement and 
analysis tools are employed using the MAM component, in order 
to collect relevant information about the test performed (including 
network traffic, internal status of the IoT-DUT, etc.). Finally, a 
forensic analysis is performed by the MRM component, based on 
the results obtained from both phases and the information 
collected during the testing process. The final results of the 
overall testing process are then generated and sent to the 
user/testbed operator (illustrated as Phase 3 on the green dashed 
line in Figure 1). 
4.2 System Components 
The testbed environment, illustrated in Figure 2, includes both 
software and hardware system components. From the internal 
software system component perspective, this includes the user 
interface and several testbed managers’ modules, each responsible 
for a specific task. From the environmental system component 
point of view, this includes the IoT device under test (IoT-DUT), 
the set of security test tools, measurement, and analysis tools, and 
a set of simulator/stimulator devices employed in the testbed, as 
described next.     
4.2.1 Internal Software System Components 
The internal software system components of the security 
testbed include the user interface (GUI/Remote), testbed manager 
(orchestrator), test manager, element manger, and storage 
manager components, which will be discussed next.   
4.2.1.1 User Interface – GUI/Remote 
The user interface component is used for sending/receiving 
commands/test results to/from the testbed, respectively. This can 
be handled locally (e.g., using a GUI) or remotely (e.g. REST 
API). SSH and Telnet connectivity are supported as well. 
4.2.1.2 Testbed Manager – Orchestrator 
The testbed manager component acts as an orchestrator in the 
system. It is responsible for managing the workflow between the 
software system components of the testbed (including the 
underlying managers: Element Manager, Test Manager, etc.).  
This component also exposes the interface of the testbed, to the 
user as well as to the hardware system components of the testbed. 
4.2.1.3 Test Manager 
The test manger component is responsible for the creation and 
execution of testing scenarios. A scenario is an object of the 
system that reflects the testing process. Therefore, it manages test 
objects, each composed of a set of action objects (for more details 
see Section 4.3). Accordingly, the test manager creates and 
manages scenario, test, and action objects; generates templates for 
each of these objects, and is responsible for executing the testing 
scenario, as well. 
4.2.1.4 Element Manager 
The element manager component is responsible for 
provisioning and deleting elements from the testbed. An element 
is a general term used in the testbed that applies to both software 
and hardware. Each element is defined by its driver. A driver is a 
programmable component that exposes the element’s capabilities, 
either to the user or to other elements of the testbed. Types of 
elements in the testbed are: IoT-DUT, simulators/stimulators, 
measurement and analysis tools, and security tests. 
4.2.1.5 Storage Manager 
The storage manager component is a repository of system 
elements. In addition, it is responsible for writing and logging 
different events occurring in the system, before, during, and after 
the test is conducted (e.g., registering simulator, driver event, test 
action being running, test results, etc.). 
4.2.2 Environmental System Components 
The environmental system components include both hardware 
and software components, including: the IoT device under test, a 
set of security tools, environmental simulators and stimulators, 
and different types of measurement and analysis tools, as 
discussed next. 
4.2.2.1 IoT Device Under Test (IoT-DUT) 
The security testbed is designed and implemented to support 
examination of a wide range of IoT devices, including different 
categories such as: smart home appliances, smart industrial 
equipment, smart city devices, wearable devices, and more. 
4.2.2.2 Security Test Tools 
The security testbed utilizes different security testing tools 
available online, including the Nmap security scanner tool for 
network discovery and security auditing [22], the Wireshark tool 
for network protocols analysis [23], Aircrack [24] to assess WiFi 
network, Metasploit is used for penetration testing [25], all these 
tools running under the Kali Linux penetration testing 
environment [26]. Nessus [27], OpenVAS [28], Cain-and-Abel 
[29], and OSSEC [30] security tools will be employed in the 
testbed as well. 
4.2.2.3 Measurement and Analysis Tools 
The security testbed uses different types of measurement and 
analysis tools, including: data collection modules, analysis and 
security rating modules, data analysis modules, and more. These 
modules will be developed in order to meet the needs of the 
testbed; for example, different anomaly detection models will be 
used in the testbed in order to automatically identify and detect 
anomalies both in the network traffic and in the internal status 
(CPU, memory, file system, system calls, etc.) of the IoT-DUTs. 
4.2.2.4 Simulators and Stimulators 
The security testbed employs different types of environmental 
simulators and stimulators (e.g., a GPS simulator that simulates 
different locations and trajectories, movement simulators such as 
robotic hands, etc.). Using the provided set of simulators 
(simulator array), the testbed realistically generates arbitrary real-
time stimulations, ideally for all sensors of the tested IoT devices. 
See Table 2 for a list of the simulators supported by the testbed. 
4.3 Testing Scenarios Methodology 
The creation of a testing scenario in the testbed is based on the 
object definitions shown in Table 3. First, a scenario object 
should be created using the test manager component of the 
testbed. A scenario object represents a specific testing scenario 
(test case) in the system, and it is defined as a complete and final 
set of test objects. Once a scenario object is defined, it may be 
saved as a scenario template for future use. A test object, which 
defines a specific test in the system, is a complete and final set of 
action objects. Once a test object is defined, it may be saved as a 
test template for future use. An action object represents a specific 
testing operation that needs to be performed. The action object 
includes an initiator, which is the element in the system that is 
responsible for initiating the action (this is done manually by the 
user or automatically by one of the system’s components, such as 
a simulator, measurement tool, etc.), the element on which the 
action is done/referred to, a command to be executed in this 
action, and the required input parameters (params) for this 
specific command/action, as described in Table 3. Note that an 
action is executed by one of the elements of the system, on a 
specific element of the system. In addition, each action object 
generates a trace log of that action in the system. All of these 
objects (scenarios, tests and actions), are the building blocks for 
the creation of a testing scenario in the testbed and are managed 
by the test manager component of the testbed. Using this testing 
methodology, the tests within the testbed are structured and 
executed in a sequential manner. 
4.4 Possible Extensions for the Testbed 
The testbed is designed and implemented as a plugin 
framework in order to support future operational capabilities. For 
example, one of the possible extensions for the testbed is an IoT 
honeypot plugin/module which will employed as a security tester 
element in the system. This module will interface with an IoT 
honeypot environment in order to collect data about attacks 
learned and patterns observed within the IoT honeypot 
framework. The module will maintain a database of attacks for 
specific IoTs and will generate these attacks in the testbed. Using 
Figure 2. IoT Security Testbed System Components. 
this extension, the testbed can be used as a physical sandbox for 
different IoT devices. Another possible extension is a risk 
assessment and management plugin/module which will employed 
as a security analysis element in the system. This module will be 
used to calculate the probability of attacks and their severity of 
impact in order to quantify risks for different IoT-DUTs. The 
incorporation of these plugin extensions (and others), will 
enhance the testbed’s capabilities, and ensure that the testbed will 
serve as a comprehensive security testing platform now and in the 
future, for future IoT case scenarios.   
Table 3. Object definitions used to create testing scenarios 
Object Description  
Action Syntax: <Initiator, Element, Command, Params> 
 Initiator: The initiator of an action (either handled manually 
by the user or automatically by one of the system’s 
entities). 
 Element: The element (component) on which the action is 
done/referred to, including: testing environment element 
(e.g., simulators/stimulators, measurement and analysis 
tools, etc.), the user (or testbed operator), and the IoT 
device under test. 
 Command: The command to be done in this action, 
including: START, STOP, CREATE, DELETE, MODIFY, 
SET, TEST, NOTIFY, SELECT, REMOVE, LOGIN, 
TEST_CONNECTION, etc. 
 Params: The required input parameters (params) for this 
specific command/action.   
 
Example: <USER, GPS_SIM, START, {trajectory.cfg}>. 
Test Represents a specific test in the system, defined as a complete 
and final set of action objects. 
Scenario Represents a specific testing scenario in the system, defined as 
a complete and final set of test objects. 
5. TESTBED IMPLEMENTATION AND 
OPERATION 
In this section we describe the testbed implementation and 
present several examples of its operation. We deployed the testbed 
system in an isolated room inside our lab (shown in Figure 3), 
which provides a testing environment with minimal external 
disruptions. We integrated the NI TestStand testing environment 
[31], and this software system provided the testbed’s testing 
management infrastructure. TestStand served as an orchestrating 
tool in the testbed and was used to create testing scenarios based 
on the testing methodology discussed in subsection 4.3. After a 
scenario is defined, TestStand can execute and manage the test 
sequence, as well as control and operate all selected components 
of the testbed, including security tools (e.g., Nmap), simulators 
(e.g., GPS simulator), and measurement and analysis tools (e.g., 
Wireshark) for the given scenario. TestStand is also used to send 
requests to the user (for user intervention purposes), and to 
generate the final report upon test completion. TestStand also 
serves as an interface with the NI LabVIEW tool [32] in order to 
integrate different hardware testing components and advanced 
capabilities into the testbed, as described below. We now present 
several test scenarios for the testbed’s operation. 
5.1 Test Scenario 1: Context-based Testing 
In this test case we demonstrate the testbed’s operation in a 
context-based scenario. For that matter, we implemented a case 
scenario in which a compromised smartwatch device executes a 
network mapping attack on an organizational network once the 
location and/or the time of the day the attacker set in advance are 
identified (note that as part of the attack, the compromised 
smartwatch device is directly connected to the organizational Wi-
Fi network). Accordingly, we established the appropriate testing 
environment in the testbed for this test scenario and executed the 
test. A Wi-Fi network simulator (Cisco router device) was used to 
simulate the organizational network environment, and a GPS 
simulator (LabSat 3 device) was used to simulate the changes in 
locations and time of the day in order to trigger the attack. 
Furthermore, Wireshark (running on a sniffer device in the 
testbed) and a device monitoring tool that we implemented 
(running via a tester device in the testbed) were employed during 
the testing process in order to monitor both the network traffic and 
the internal status of the smartwatch device under test (the CPU, 
memory, and file system), respectively. The setup configuration 
for this test scenario is shown in Figure 4.  
The testing sequence executed within the TestStand testing 
environment is shown in Figure 5. First, all of the relevant 
components of the testbed for the test were automatically 
configured via TestStand; these include the IoT-DUT, network 
sniffer, Wi-Fi and GPS simulators, and the data collection tools. 
The test was then executed by TestStand. In this phase of the 
testing process a prerecorded path was replayed in the testbed 
environment by the GPS simulator, and both the sniffer and the 
tester devices recorded the network traffic, the CPU and memory 
status of the smartwatch device under test, and the GPS signals, 
respectively. Finally, upon completion of the test, we gathered all 
of the test results, including the pcap file, the internal status of the 
DUT, and more, and manually analyzed the results obtained.  
Based on the analysis conducted (illustrated in Figure 6), we 
were able to detect two network mapping attacks, as well as one 
Figure 4. The testbed configuration used for the context-
based scenario, including GPS and Wi-Fi simulators, 
Tester and Sniffer monitoring devices, the smartwatch 
device as the IoT-DUT, all controlled and managed by the 
NI TestStand tool.  
Figure 3. The isolated room in which the testbed was 
deployed, equipped with an internal IP camera in order to 
control the testing process outside the testbed 
environment.  
false alarm event which occurred during the testing process. 
Moreover, we managed to identify the exact locations and the 
time of the day in which the attacks executed. We accomplished 
this by correlating the anomalous events between the tested 
smartwatch’s activities (CPU and memory), the network traffic 
behavior (observed in the testbed environment), and the GPS 
measurements (time and location) which recorded during the test. 
5.2 Test Scenario 2: Profiling IoT Devices  
In this test case we demonstrate the testbed’s operation for 
profiling IoT devices in the testbed environment. For that matter, 
we implemented a profiler module and integrated it into the 
testbed system as a tester/analyzer tool. The profiler module is 
based on a machine learning algorithm which analyzes the 
network traffic observed during the testing process. The module is 
operated in two phases, a training phase and a testing phase. 
During the training phase of the test scenario, a statistical model is 
trained based on the network traffic captured in the testbed 
environment. Given this statistical model, different IoT devices 
are analyzed in the testbed (based on their network activity as 
well) during the testing phase, in order to automatically profile the 
tested devices. For more details about the profiler module 
implementation and operation see Appendix B. 
This case scenario shows the testbed’s ability to automatically 
identify and profile IoT devices based only on their network 
activity. Using this software component we can learn how IoT 
devices behave. For example, we can identify whether a specific 
malicious IoT device impersonates other IoT devices, based on 
observing the network traffic during its operation. Moreover, we 
can use this component in order to categorize IoT devices (both 
benign and malicious) into behavioral groups, defining groups of 
devices based on specific behavioral measures.  
 The testing process conducted for this test scenario is as 
follows. For the training phase, first we deployed several IoT 
devices in the testbed, including a smart thermostat device, a 
movement sensor, smartwatch and smart glass (Google Glass) 
devices, IP camera, a smart socket, and a smart TV, as shown in 
Figure 7. Next, we created a testing scenario in TestStand, in 
order to record the network activity of these devices in the testbed 
environment during this phase of the test. This information was 
then used by the profiler module to define the statistical model in 
the testbed. For the testing phase of this test scenario, we 
deployed other IoT devices in the testbed environment, including 
a smart home kit (a Piper device: the All-in-One wireless security 
system for the home), a smartwatch device (a different device 
than that used in the training phase), and a smart connected 
lighting kit (a Philips Hue kit, for connecting ZigBee bulbs in the 
testbed, that was analyzed based on the communication 
interaction between the application installed in a smartphone 
device with the smart bulb bridge device of that kit), as shown in 
Figure 7. We created another testing scenario in TestStand, where 
in this phase of the test, these IoT devices were tested against the 
constructed statistical model and profiled respectively (meaning, 
these IoT devices were profiled using the profiler module based 
on their network activity observed during this phase of the test). 
See Figure 8 for the testing sequence executed in the TestStand 
testing environment for this test scenario. 
Note that the IoT devices that were used during the training 
phase were employed as environmental simulators in the testbed, 
in order to establish a more complex (yet realistic) environmental 
IoT setting; the statistical model was constructed based on these 
devices. Whereas, the IoT devices that were used in the testing 
phase are the IoT-DUTs for this specific test scenario (these 
devices were profiled based on the statistical model constructed in 
the training phase). Moreover, to be able to monitor the network 
activity of all of the IoT devices, each of them was connected to 
the Wi-Fi network that was simulated in the testbed, and a sniffer 
device was used (during both the training and the testing phases).  
Figure 6. The results for the context-based testing 
scenario, including the internal status of the smartwatch 
device under test (CPU and memory perspectives), and 
the communication traffic observed in the testbed 
environment during the test. 
Figure 7. The testbed configuration used for the profiling 
IoT devices scenario, including the array of simulators (Wi-
Fi router and IoT devices), several IoT-DUTs, and a sniffer 
monitoring device, all controlled and managed by the NI 
TestStand tool. The profiler module integrated as a 
software component in TestStand for this test scenario. 
Figure 5. The testing sequence executed in NI TestStand 
tool for the context-based scenario. 
Upon completion of the test, the final results for this test 
scenario (the decision made by the profiler module for each tested 
IoT device given the statistical model), were generated in the 
TestStand environment. Table 4 presents the results obtained. 
Note that the rows in the table refer to the IoT devices that were 
used to construct the statistical model during the training phase, 
and hence are defined as the testing model in the table; the 
columns in the table refer to the IoT devices that were tested 
during the testing phase of this test scenario, and hence are 
defined as IoT-DUTs in the table. The numbers in the table are the 
estimations of the statistical model for each IoT-DUT given the 
model (with respect to each IoT device that was used to construct 
the statistical model). As can be seen from the table, the tested 
smartwatch device is profiled as a Smartwatch device, given the 
statistical model, with a level of accuracy of 85.71%. This means 
that by using the profiler module we able to automatically identify 
and profile the smartwatch device under test in the testbed with a 
relatively high level of accuracy. The smart bulb bridge device, 
however, was profiled as a Smart TV (with 56.53% accuracy) and 
a Smartwatch device (with 21.68%), given the model; and the 
smart home kit device (Piper) was profiled as a Smart Glass 
device (with 72.90% accuracy). 
Table 4. Profiling IoT-DUTs given a statistical model 
  The results can be explained as follows. As long as the 
statistical model includes instances of the same types as the tested 
devices, the profiler module will automatically identify and 
profile the tested devices with a high degree of accuracy (as in the 
case of the smartwatch device under test). This means that once 
the testbed (using the profiler module) learned about the activity 
of an IoT device (its network activity), it is possible to 
successfully (or effectively) profile other IoT devices from the 
same family (type). However, if the statistical model does not 
already include instances of the same type as the tested devices 
(as in the cases of the smart home kit and smart bulb bridge 
devices), the tested devices will be profiled by the profiler module 
as devices that most closely match instances that are included in 
the statistical model. Moreover, for the final calculations we used 
a weighted average with respect to the probability estimation 
obtained from the statistical model (where predictions were 
estimated with some level of percentage of accuracy, not 
necessary 100%), therefore the overall profiling of each tested IoT 
device (the sum of the column of each IoT-DUT) is not 1. Note 
that the main objective of this case scenario is to illustrate the 
testbed’s ability to automatically profile IoT devices. In future 
work, we intend to enhance the profiler module in order to 
improve its level of accuracy. This includes training more IoT 
devices in the testbed, and in different context-based scenarios, in 
order to collect additional information about the real network 
traffic of IoT devices, and to employ other machine learning 
algorithms in order to establish a more accurate statistical model.  
5.3 Test Scenario 3: Port Scanning 
In this test case, we show the penetration testing methodology, 
port scanning and show the complete flow of our testbed. The 
motivation behind using port scanning as a test case is to 
demonstrate how an IoT device in an environment can be 
vulnerable with open ports and how an IoT device can be affected.  
The setup for this test case is that we have a PC that runs the 
LabVIEW, to make sure that we can connect various IoT devices 
(as IoT-DUT’s), measurement tools, etc., as shown in Figure 9. In 
this scenario the Power Supply Unit (PSU) is connected to the 
LabVIEW PC and the IoT-DUT is the IP camera. The setup also 
contains another PC which runs as the analysis machine and 
testing tool Nmap is present. 
 
 
Figure 9. The setup showing the PC running LabVIEW and 
connected to the PSU and the IP camera as IoT-DUT (top left 
picture). PC running Nmap (top right picture). 
In this test scenario, the sequence of steps (starting from 
initializing the test to generating the report), is orchestrated from 
TestStand. TestStand works like a flow control and coded to fit 
required task to test IoT devices. The TestStand initializes the test 
and sends a message to LabVIEW to activate. PSU is connected to 
LabVIEW which is in turn connected to the IP camera as IoT-
DUT. LabVIEW controls the power supply and is able to turn ON 
and OFF the IoT-DUT. Accordingly, in the TestStand test 
sequence, the voltage and the ampere input are requested from the 
user (via two pop ups, one asking a value for voltage and another 
for ampere) and the entered values are stored as the local 
variables. TestStand sends the entered values as the variants to 
LabVIEW, where the variants are decoded and the values are 
appended to the respective location to set voltage and ampere. 
LabVIEW will then turn ON the PSU, which turns ON the IP 
camera connected to the PSU.  
 
Testing Model 
IoT-DUTs 
Smart Home 
Kit 
Smart Bulb 
Bridge 
Smartwatch 
Thermostat 0.00% 0.03% 0.00% 
Movement Sensor 0.00% 0.10% 0.00% 
Smartwatch 20.00% 21.68% 85.71% 
Smart Glass 72.90% 0.78% 13.43% 
IP Camera 3.81% 1.02% 0.00% 
Smart Socket 0.00% 5.81% 0.00% 
Smart TV 0.48% 56.53% 0.00% 
Figure 8. The testing sequence executed in NI TestStand 
tool for the profiling IoT devices test scenario.  
Once the IoT-DUT is ON, it automatically connects to the 
dedicated experimental access point. Additional wait time has 
been included to allow the IoT-DUT to connect to the access 
point. Set of Python scripts is developed in the analysis machine 
for further interaction with the TestStand. After the wait time 
expires, the Pyton script in the analysis machine triggers the 
TestStand for the IP address of the IoT-DUT to be tested. After 
entering the IP Address to scan, TestStand will trigger analysis 
machine to run the Nmap to discover the open ports on the entered 
IP Address through a SSH setup. After Nmap finishing the port 
scan, the results are saved as an XML file. TestStand will then 
trigger the analysis machine to run a custom Python script that 
extracts the discovered open ports from the XML file. The XML 
file is looped line by line checking for the keyword “Discovered”. 
Any line detecting the keyword “Discovered” is appended in a file 
with list of open ports. Finally, we compare our scan results with 
the score list of top vulenrable ports [33]. The file with the score 
list of top vulenerable ports contain the top vulnerable ports 
number, descriptions of the ports and the metric score given to 
each port. The Python script compares the open port against a list 
of vulnerable open ports and identify those vulnerable ports for 
reporting. If the word "Discovered" is not found in the XML file, 
the whole XML file is copied as the output result, which indeed 
displays everything that is scanned.  
We have setup a metric system to evaluate the risk level of 
open ports. The risk level is set as: 0 – safe, <15 – minor risk, 15< 
&& <30 – major risk and >30 – critical risk. The Python script in 
the analysis machine saves two text files to return to TestStand. 
The “Overall Results” and the “Metric Score”. As shown in 
Figure 10, after obtaining the scan results from the Nmap, the 
scan results are compared with the score list of top vulnerable 
ports to provide the “Overall Results”. In the “Overall Results” 
the list of open ports, ports that are considered to be vulnerable 
and the metric ratings are reflected. For e.g., in one of our test 
case the list of open ports discovered were 135/tcp, 139/tcp, 
80/tcp, 5900/tcp, 445/tcp, 443/tcp, 49152/tcp, 6646/tcp,  2869/tcp 
on IP 10.0.8.100. The ports that were considered vulnerable with 
services running were 80: A web server is running on this port 
with Score: 3, 5900: A vnc server is running on this port with 
Score: 3, 445: Microsoft-DS Active Directory, Windows shares 
with Score: 1, 443: A TLSv1 server answered on this port with 
Score: 5 and 49152: The Win32 process 'wininit.exe' is listening 
on this port with Score: 1. In this case, the overall Risk Level is 
assessed as Minor Risk and the Metric Score is 13. 
 
 
Figure 10. The results obtained from the port scanning test 
scenario. 
At this point in process, TestStand will then trigger LabVIEW 
to determine the “Risk Factor” of the IoT Device. It will call on 
the “MetricScore” file, retrieve the metric number, and determine 
the “RISK” from a pre-defined “Risk Margin”. After LabVIEW 
obtains the “Risk Factor” string, the information is sent back to 
TestStand. Finally, TestStand will then move on to the step of 
turning OFF the PSU. After turning OFF the PSU, TestStand will 
then show the conclusion of the test through a popup message. 
Log file is automatically saved in a fixed location for user access. 
6. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK 
The Internet of Things (IoT) is an emerging technology that 
transforms ordinary physical devices, such as televisions, 
refrigerators, watches, cars, and more, into smart connected 
devices. The potential applications associated with the IoT are 
seemingly infinite, with new and innovative features and 
capabilities being developed almost daily. However, the extensive 
benefits and opportunities provided by IoT computing are 
accompanied by major potential compromises in data privacy and 
security, in that any smart device becomes a security risk. 
Moreover, due to the heterogeneous nature of such devices 
(different OSs installed, produced by different manufacturers, 
several communication channels supported, etc.) and the fact that 
they are used in a variety of contexts, analyzing and ensuring the 
security of such devices is considered a complex task. 
Therefore, in this paper we propose an innovative security 
testbed framework for IoT devices. The proposed testbed is 
designed to perform traditional security testing, based on 
penetration test methodology, in different contexts and 
environments. This is accomplished by realistically simulating the 
environment in which IoT devices exist (such as location, 
movement, etc.), in order to identify and detect context-based 
attacks that may be carried out by compromised IoT devices. 
The proposed security testbed aims for a black-box approach in 
which we assume that only the final product is available. In 
addition, the proposed framework is targeted specifically at IoT 
devices and is designed to execute relevant security tests with 
minimal human intervention. The downside of such an approach 
is that it cannot provide a mapping of the IoT device (or its 
functions) at a specified security/assurance level, but instead 
provides a list of the test results (based on the success criteria 
defined for each test in Appendix A). Moreover, detecting 
context-based attacks requires the execution of a security test in 
various contexts. We can assume that simulating all possible 
contexts in the testbed is not feasible due to the potentially large 
number of context variables. For example, when considering 
location as a context for the security test, although we can use a 
simulation application to generate different trajectories and replay 
them in the testbed (e.g., using SATGEN GPS simulation 
software [34]), it will be impossible to run a context-based test 
that covers all possible locations. Therefore, we define two types 
of context-based tests: targeted and sample tests. In a targeted test 
we assume that a bounded set of contexts to be evaluated by the 
testbed is provided as an input to the testing process. For example, 
an IoT device that is going to be deployed in a specific 
organizational environment will be tested with the organization’s 
specific geographical location, given the execution limits of the 
testbed. In a sample test, a subset of all possible contexts (those 
that can be simulated) is evaluated. This subset is selected 
randomly according to a priori assumptions about contexts of 
interest (e.g., malicious activity is usually executed at night, the 
device is installed in a home environment, etc.). 
In future work we intend to enhance the testbed’s system 
capacity in order to support its full operational capability. This 
includes deployment of additional simulator devices, 
implementation of advanced measurement and analysis tools, and 
further automation of the testing process. Moreover, in order to 
extend the scope of the security testing we intend to connect the 
security testbed with a honeypot environment. Based on that, 
additional requirements for a satisfactory IoT security testbed, as 
well as its potential limitations, will be provided. This will allow 
us to define which features are essential for testing various IoT 
devices used in different contexts and in different environments. 
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APPENDIX 
A. PENETRATION TESTS SUPPORTED 
BY THE SECURITY TESTBED 
The following table presents a list of penetration tests and an 
appropriate test/success criterion for each test that are supported 
by our proposed security testbed.   
Table 5. Penetration Tests Supported by the Security Testbed 
Test Description Test/Success criteria 
Scanning (e.g., IP 
and port scanning) 
Investigate the 
detectability of IoT 
devices by observing 
wireless/wired 
communication 
channels. Attempt to 
identify the existence of 
the device. Enumerate 
communication 
channels/traffic types 
observed, open ports, 
etc. 
Undetectable- the IoT-DUT 
cannot be detected by the 
testbed via any communication 
channel; Safe- the IoT-DUT is 
detectable, but no open ports 
were observed; Minor risk- the 
IoT-DUT is detectable, and 
common ports are open, e.g., 
port 80 (HTTP), 443 (HTTPS), 
etc.; Major risk- the IoT-DUT 
is detectable, and uncommon 
ports for such devices are 
open, e.g., ports 20, 21 (FTP), 
port 22 (SSH), port 23 
(Telnet), etc.; or, Critical risk- 
the IoT-DUT is detectable, and 
unexpected ports are open in 
the device.    
Fingerprinting By monitoring 
communication traffic 
to/from the device, 
attempt to identify the 
type of device, its 
operating system, 
software version, list of 
all sensors supported, 
etc. 
Unidentifiable- the type of 
IoT-DUT cannot be identified 
by the testbed; Safe- the device 
provides identifiable 
information, but all the IoT-
DUT’s software versions are 
up-to-date; Minor risk- some 
low risk detected applications, 
e.g., calendar, etc., are out-of-
date; Major risk- some major 
risk detected applications, e.g., 
navigator, mail, etc., are out-
of-date; or, Critical risk- 
operating system and critical 
applications are out-of-date. 
Process 
enumeration 
Lists all running 
processes on the device 
and presents their CPU 
and memory 
consumptions. This can 
be done by monitoring 
the device’s activities, 
e.g., using ADB 
(Android Debug Bridge) 
connectivity. 
Safe- the list of processes 
cannot be extracted without 
admin privileges; 
Moderate risk- the list of 
processes can be extracted 
without admin privileges on 
the device only; or, Fail- the 
list of processes can be 
remotely extracted without 
admin privileges. 
Data leakage Validate which parts of 
the communication 
to/from the device are 
encrypted (and how) or 
sent in clear text, and 
accordingly check if an 
application leaks data 
out of the device. 
Pass- traffic is encrypted, and 
no data leaks are detected; or, 
Fail- traffic is unencrypted and 
sent in clear text, therefore 
data may leak from the IoT-
DUT.  
Data collection Check if an application 
on an IoT device 
collects sensor data and 
stores it on the device. 
This can be achieved by 
monitoring the locally 
stored data and 
correlating sensor 
events. 
Safe- the tested application 
does not collect and store data 
on the IoT-DUT; Minor risk- 
the tested application collects 
and stores normal data, e.g., 
multimedia files, on the IoT-
DUT; Major risk- the tested 
application collects and stores 
sensitive data, e.g., GPS 
locations, on the IoT-DUT; or, 
Critical risk- the tested 
application collects and stores 
critical information, e.g., 
device status (CPU, memory, 
sensor events, etc.), on the 
IoT-DUT.  
Management 
access 
Attempt to access the 
management 
interface/API of a device 
using one of the 
communication 
channels. Access could 
be obtained by using 
default credentials, a 
dictionary attack, or 
other known exploits. 
Pass- management access 
ports, e.g., port 22 (SSH), port 
23 (Telnet), are closed; or, 
Fail- one of the management 
access ports is open on the 
tested device. 
Breaking 
encrypted traffic 
Apply known/available 
techniques of breaking 
Pass- unable to decrypt traffic 
sent/received by/to the IoT-
Test Description Test/Success criteria 
encrypted traffic. For 
example, try to redirect 
HTTPS to HTTP traffic 
(SSLstrip) or 
impersonate remote 
servers with self-
certificates (to apply a 
man-in-the-middle 
attack). 
DUT with the applied 
techniques; or, Fail- able to 
decrypt traffic data 
sent/received by/to the IoT-
DUT using the applied 
techniques. 
Spoofing/ 
masquerade attack 
Attempt to generate 
communication on 
behalf of the tested IoT 
device. For example, 
determine if any of the 
communication types 
can be replayed to the 
external server. 
Pass- reply attack failed; or, 
Fail- replay attack successful.  
Communication 
delay attacks 
Delay the delivery of 
traffic between the 
device and remote 
server, without changing 
its data content. 
Determine which 
maximal delays are 
tolerated on both ends. 
Safe- the time delay between 
two consecutive transactions of 
the IoT-DUT is within the 
defined/normal range; or, 
Unsafe- the time delay is 
greater than the defined/normal 
range.  
Communication 
tampering 
Attempt to selectively 
manipulate or block data 
sent to/from the device. 
For example, inject bit 
errors on different 
communication layers or 
apply varying levels of 
noise on the wireless 
channel. 
Safe- the device ignores 
received 
manipulated/erroneous data; 
or, 
Unsafe- the device crashes or 
behaves unexpectedly when 
manipulated/erroneous data is 
sent. 
List known 
vulnerabilities 
Given the type, brand, 
version of the device, 
running services, and 
installed applications—
list all known 
vulnerabilities that could 
be exploited. 
Safe- no relevant 
vulnerabilities were found; 
Minor risk - insignificant/low 
risk vulnerabilities were found; 
or, Unsafe- significant and 
critical vulnerabilities where 
found. 
Vulnerability scan Search for additional 
classes of vulnerabilities 
by: (1) utilizing existing 
tools (or developing new 
dedicated ones as part of 
the ongoing research) 
that attempt to detect 
undocumented 
vulnerabilities such as 
buffer overflow and 
SQL injection; (2) 
maintaining a database 
of attacks (exploits) 
detected on previously 
tested IoTs or detected 
by honeypots, and 
evaluate 
relevant/selected attacks 
on the tested IoT; and 
(3) using automated 
tools for code scanning. 
Safe- no new vulnerabilities 
were found during the testing 
process conducted; 
Minor risk- insignificant/low 
risk new vulnerabilities were 
found; or, Unsafe- significant 
and critical new vulnerabilities 
were found. 
 
B. PROFILER MODULE FOR IOT 
DEVICES 
The profiler module for IoT devices is based on a machine 
learning algorithm which analyzes the network traffic observed in 
the testbed environment during the testing process. As mentioned 
in subsection 5.2, the module operates in two phases, a training 
phase and a testing phase, as illustrated in Figure 11. First, in the 
training phase, a statistical model is defined based on the network 
activity recorded during this phase (for that matter, several IoT 
devices are deployed in the testbed environment). Next, in the 
testing phase, different IoT devices (that were not used during the 
Figure 11. The IoT profiler module structure, including 
features extraction, statistical model and decision 
making submodules.  
 
training phase) are profiled based on their network behavior, 
given the statistical model constructed in previous phase. 
 Note that the training phase is executed initially only once, 
although it may be necessary to retrain the statistical model later 
(in order to update the model with new IoT devices). The testing 
phase is executed each time we test (profile) an IoT device in the 
testbed. Moreover, the IoT devices used during the training phase 
were employed as environmental simulators in the testbed, 
whereas the IoT devices that were used in the testing phase were 
operated as the IoT-DUTs for this case scenario. Furthermore, in 
both phases, a sniffer device records the network traffic observed 
in the testbed environment during the test (which represented as 
pcap files and used as an input for the testing process). 
The profiler module is composed of several submodules, as 
presented in Figure 11. A features extraction submodule 
implemented in python is used to represent the recorded network 
traffic (during both the training and the testing phases) as discrete 
sequences of network traces, based on a set of selected features 
(e.g., session-based features, such as ttl, pkt_size, 
pkt_arrival_time, etc.). The statistical model submodule and the 
decision making submodule are both based on the implementation 
of the J48 classification algorithm in Weka [35]. The former is 
used to construct the statistical model during the training phase 
(see Figure 12 for the result confusion matrix of the statistical 
model),  and the latter is used to profile each IoT device under test 
during the testing phase, given the statistical model constructed in 
the training phase. Both submodules based on the features-based 
discrete sequences generated in each phase. All of the above 
submodules were wrapped in a c# code in order to implement the 
profiler module as a complete tester/analyzer component in the 
testbed, as well as to enable integration of the profiler module in 
the NI TestStand testing environment.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12. The result confusion matrix of the 
constructed statistical model.  
